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SOME lAWYERS' PROBLEMS IN GRIEVANCE
ARBIRATION*
ARCHIBALD Cox**
A recent search of arbitration law has uncovered an ancient
award which some may regard as typical of labor arbitration.
"The undersigned, arbitrators within named, having heard
the parties by their several statements under oath, . and,
there being a wide divergence in their statements aforesaid, we
come to the final conclusion that m the amount of damages we
do not agree on any sum; but our agreement is, that each party
pay his own arbitrators the sum of five dollars each."
Surely those arbitrators spoke with the wisdom of Solomon,
and it will be a matter of regret to all arbitrators, if not to the
parties, to learn that so statesmanlike a decision was held invalid
by the Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts.' However, by
way of comfort to brother arbitrators another case can be cited
which suggests that even if a losing party were so outraged by an
arbitration award as to bring an action for damages against the
arbitrator alleging that the arbitrator and the opposing party had
entered into an unlawful conspiracy,--that even if these facts were
proved, the arbitrator would not be liable.2
Not only is grievance arbitration commanding increased atten-
tion from labor lawyers but its strictly legal aspects seem to be
becoming more and more important. There is a new concern for
the legal nforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitration
awards which was scarcely felt five years ago. Since the effort to
cover all the lawyer's problems in grievance arbitration would take
us far afield, it is necessary to confine the discussion to two
subjects
First, the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate disputes
arising under collective bargaining agreements. The problem usual-
ly arises when a union is seeking to arbitrate a grievance and the
employer refuses, but one occasionally encounters a situation where
the union is so strong that it prefers to strike.
Second, the vexed subject of "arbitrability." Who decides the
issue if the union asserts, and the company denies, that a particular
dispute falls into a class of controversies which they have agreed to
*Tns article was delivered as an address m St. Paul, Minnesota, before
the Section of Labor Relations Law at the Northwest Regional Meeting of
the American Bar Association on October 13, 1955.
**Professor of Law, Harvard University.
1. Cf. Smith v. Holcomb, 99 Mass. 552, 553 (1868).
2. Cf. Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424
(1884).
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submit to arbitration? When is the issue to be decided? By what
criteria?
I. ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE
Common Law
At common law there was no effective legal sanction for the
enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate controversies which might
arise in the future under the terms of an existing contract. Ever
since the decision of Lord Coke in the Vynior's case3 an agreement
to arbitrate has been revocable at any time prior to the award.
4 If
you ask "Why," the best available answer is to quote the say-
ing with which my father always silenced a too argumentative son
-- "If your mother says 'tis so, 'tis so, if 'tain't so." Similarly, since
Lord Coke said 'tis revocable, 'tis revocable if 'tain't revocable. In
theory, the revocation is a breach of the contract and an action will
lie for damages.5 In practice, this remedy is useless because the
damages recoverable are limited to sums expended preparing for
arbitration prior to notice of revocation." Under the prevailing com-
mon law rule, moreover, breach of a promise to arbitrate disputes
arising under a collective agreement is not a bar to an action for
damages arising out of the alleged violation of some other provision
in the agreement. Although some of the court decisions in States
in this region suggest that performance of the agreement to arbitrate
may be a condition precedent to an action when a contract so
stipulates, it seems likely that the general common law rule would
be followed in a labor case either on the ground that the exception
is applicable only to appraisals or else because the language of the
collective agreement did not explicitly make arbitration a condition
precedent to suit.7 The courts have consistently held that an em-
ployer may sue in court to recover damages for breach of a no-
3. 8 Coke 81b-83a, 77 Eng. Rep. 595 (1609)
4. Local 1111, U. E. R. & M. W of A. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 259 Wis.
609, 49 N. W 2d 720 (1951) See also Ames Canning Co. v. Dexter Seed Co.,
195 Iowa 1285, 190 N. W 167 (1922). Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 47
Neb. 138, 66 N. W 278 (1896) , Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. Cooper, 59
Minn. 290, 61 N. W 143 (1894) See also the elaborate dissenting opinion
of Justice Peterson in Park Construction Co. v. Independent School District
No. 32, 209 Minn. 182, 188, 296 N. W 475, 478 (1941).
5. Mead v. Owen, 83 Vt. 132, 74 Atl. 1058 (1910) , Pond v. Harris, 113
Mass. 114 (1873).
6. 6 Williston, Contracts § 1927 (rev. ed. 1938) , Restatement, Con-
tracts § 550 (1932).
7 Ensley v. Associated Terminals, Inc., 304 Mich. 522, 8 N. W 2d 161
(1943) Whitney v. National Masonic Accident Ass'n, 52 Minn. 378, 54 N. W
184 (1893) , McGunn v. Hanlin, 29 Mich. 476 (1874). But cf. Park Construe-




strike clause in disregard of a grievance procedure calling for final
and binding arbitration of all disputes arising under the agreement
either on this theory or else on the ground that the usual form of
arbitration clause does not apply to strikes in breach of contract.'
State Legislation
The familiar statutes regularizing arbitration and providing for
submission of existing controversies have scant application to the
grievance arbitration clauses in labor agreements either because
the clauses cover matters not subject to an action at law or suit in
equity or because they are not limited to existing disputes. Of more
importance in some States-New York and Connecticut, for Cox-
ample-are the arbitration laws applicable to clauses to arbitrate
future' disputes arising under a written contractY These statutes
usually cover four main points.
First, it is expressly provided that an agreement to arbitrate
any controversy thereafter arising out of a written contract "shall
be valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
Second, in the event either party fails to perform an agreement
to arbitrate, the other party may apply for a summary order direct-
ing that the arbitration proceed. Such an order is to issue if the
-court is satisfied "that there is no substantial issue as to the making
of contract or submission or the failure to comply therewith. ..
Third, a party to such a contract may obtain a stay of any
action brought by the other party on an issue which they have
agreed to arbitrate.
Fourth, a summary procedure is provided for the enforcement
of an arbitration award. The award is final and binding unless (1)
it was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means or (2)
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrator. Wis-
consin, for instance, has enacted such a statute, but even the Wis-
consin law contains an exception making it plainly inapplicable to
contracts of employment and collective bargaining agreements1
On the other hand, Wisconsin, unlike some other States, also has
8. E.g., United Electrical R. & M. W of A. v. Miller Metal Products.
215 F. 2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954) ; Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. United
Furniture Workers, 168 F. 2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948) ; Harris Hub Bed & Spring
Co. v. United Electrical 1. & M. W of A., 121 F. Supp. 40 (M.D. Pa. 1954) ;
Boston & Maine Transportation Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, 106 F Supp.
334 (D. Mass. 1952).
9. E.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. §§8151 et. scq. (1949) ; New York Civ. Prac.
Act §§ 1448-1469.
10. Local 1111, U. E. R & M. W of A. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 259 Wqis.
609, 49 N. W. 2d 720 (1951).
1955]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
made it an unfair labor practice for either a union or an employer
to violate a collective bargaining agreement including a contract to
submit future grievances to arbitration. 1 Under this statute the
Wisconsin Employment Relations Board may issue an order re-
quiring a recalcitrant party to proceed to arbitration in accordance
with the contract.'1
Federal Legislation
The enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act opened another avenue
of possible relief for the union or employer seeking to enforce the
arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement. Section
301 (a) provides-
"SEC. 301. (a) Suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act may be
brought in any district court of the United States having juris-
diction of the parties, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
A majority of the inferior federal courts have held that this pro-
vision authorizes a decree of specific enforcement.' 8 A few judges
have disagreed,' 4 and recently an appeal from one such adverse
ruling was argued in the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.18
Only a Supreme Court ruling will set the question at rest, but the
decision of the First Circuit may well exert important influence.
Any suit to enforce an arbitration agreement under Section
301 raises a number of difficult issues warranting discussion but
as a preface it is necessary to recall the decision in Ass'n of West-
mnghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Co.- A
union, acting as bargaining representative of a group of salaried
employees, sued Westinghouse under Section 301 alleging that the
employer had violated a collective bargaining agreement by dock-
ing the pay of salaried employees for a day on which they did no
11. Wis. Stat. § 111.06(1) (c) (f) (1953).
12. Dunphy Boat Corp. v. Wis. E. R. Bd., 267 Wis. 316, 64 N. WV 2d
866 (1954).
13. Local 207, U. E. R. & M. W of A. v. Landers, Frary & Clark, 119
F Supp. 877 (D. Conn. 1954), The Evening Star Newspaper Co. v. Colum-
bia Typographical Union, 124 F Supp. 322 (D.D.C. 1954), Insurance Agents
International Union v. Prudential Ins. Co., 122 F Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa.
1954), Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F Supp. 137
(D. Mass. 1953).
14. Newspaper Guild v. Times Pub. Co., 131 F Supp. 499 (D.R.I.
1955) , Industrial Trades Union of America v. Dunn Worsted Mills, 131 F
Supp. 945 (D.R.I. 1955), Local 205, U. E. R. & M. W of A. v. General
Electric Co., 129 F Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1955).
15. Local 205, U. E. R. & M. W of A. v. General Electric Co., jupra
note 14.
16. 348 U. S. 437 (1955).
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work. The Supreme Court held that the case should be dismissed
for want of jurisdiction.
Mr. justice Frankfurter delivered an opinion on behalf of him-
self and Justices Burton and Minton in which he developed these
propositions. (a) Section 301 creates no substantive federal law,
but merely provides a forum for litigation over alleged violations
of collective bargaining agreements. (b) There is constitutional
doubt whether Congress may confer this jurisdiction upon constitu-
tional courts where there is no diversity of citizenship, for in the
absence of substantive federal rights the action may not arise under
the laws of the United States. (c) To avoid the constitutional doubt,
Section 301 ought to be held not to authorize the district courts to
hear actions brought by unions to recover wages allegedly due indi-
vidual workers. This disposed of the case but in the course of the
opinion Mr. justice Frankfurter said that he and his two colleagues
were disposed to think as a inatter of stbstantive law that unions
should be allowed to sue for breach of the contracts which they
negotiate.
1 7
Mr. Justice Reed's separate opinion challenges the views ex-
pressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter at every point but he con-
curred in the judgment on the ground "that the claim for wages for
the employees arises from separate hiring contracts between the
employer and each employee." Therefore, he said, "there is set out
no violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organi-
zation as is required to confer jurisdiction under § 301. ' rs
The Chief justice and Mr. Justice Clark straddled the issues
dividing justices Frankfurter and Reed with the Delphic pro-
nouncement that "the language of § 301 is not sufficiently explicit
nor its legislative history sufficiently clear to indicate that Congress
intended to authorize a union to enforce in a federal court the
uniquely personal right of an employee for whom it had bargained
to receive compensation for services rendered his employer."' 9 Ac-
cordingly, they joined in voting to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas dissented urging
that the federal court had jurisdiction and the union should be
permitted to sue.
Let us now return to the problems raised by an action tinder
Section 301 to compel an employer or union to arbitrate a grievance.
(1) One issue suggested by the Westinghouse case is whether
Section 301 is unconstitutional because it seeks to give the federal
17 Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec-
trical Co., 348 U. S. 437, 457-459 (1955).
18. Id. at 464.
19. Id. at 461.
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courts jurisdiction of cases not covered by Article III, or, in the
alternative, is to be construed so narrowly as not to reach such
actions in order to avoid constitutional doubts. In my opinion
neither argument is very persuasive. The lower courts have unani-
mously held that Section 301 is constitutional2 and most com-
mentators approve the ruling.21 While the Westinghouse case will
undoubtedly encourage relitigation of the constitutional question,
the outcome is not likely to be changed. With respect to the inter-
pretation of the statute, it should be enough to say that if Section
301 does not give jurisdiction over suits for alleged violations of
the arbitration clause of a labor contract, nothing remains except
employer's actions for alleged breach of a "no-strike" clause. There
is no evidence that the purpose of Congress was so narrow and
one sided.
(2) We may also quickly dismiss the second question suggested
by the Westinghouse case-has a union standing to sue to enforce
an agreement to arbitrate where the underlying grievance is the
personal claim of an individual employee, for example, a claim
that he was discharged without just cause. In form the promise to
arbitrate always runs to the union. In practice it is nearly always
the union which decides whether to take a case to arbitration. Con-
sequently, although the union may be acting in a representative
capacity, it has the standing to sue. (In the Westinghouse case five
justices thought a union could sue-but not under Section 301-
to enforce the individual's claim for wages.)22
(3) A third issue is somewhat more serious. Since an order
compelling arbitration is in the nature of specific performance, we
must inquire whether a district court may grant equitable relief
under Section 301 or is limited to a judgment for damages. The
statutory language gives scant guidance because it speaks of "Stits
for violation of contracts" which might imply either meaning,
but a plaintiff might gain some comfort from the contrast between
these wide-open words and the narrower phrases of Section 303
which provide that "whoever shall be injured in his business
20. United Electrical R. & M. W of A. v. Oliver Corp., 205 F 2d 376
(8th Cir. 1953), Waialua Agricultural Co. v. United Sugar Workers, 114
F Supp. 243 (D. Hawaii 1953), Textile Workers Union v. American
Thread Co., 113 F Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953), Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v.
Textile Workers, 108 F Supp. 45 (D. Del. 1952) , Wilson & Co. v. United
Packinghouse Workers, 83 F Supp. 162 (S.D. N.Y. 1949), Colonial Hard-
wood Flooring Co. v. United Furniture Workers, 76 F Supp. 493 (D. Md.),
aff'd, 168 F 2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948).
21. Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System
744-747 (1953), Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts. 53
Col. L. Rev. 157, 184-196 (1953).
22. Justices Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton and Minton.
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may sue and shall recover damages. ." A significant number
of cases hold that equitable relief is not available under Section
301, -3 but the weight of opinion permits it where otherwise ap-
propriate. -
(4) We come now to a major problem the importance of which
goes far beyond arbitration. In an action under Section 301 is the
federal court bound to follow State law-in which event one would
gain nothing by suing in the federal court to enforce an agreement
for arbitration-or may the federal court develop its own law with
respect to the enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate?
Shortly after enactment, Section 301 was attacked as uncon-
stitutional because it attempted to confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts without regard to the citizenship of the parties in cases not
"arising under.., the laws of the United States.12 5 The contention
was invariably rejected by holding that actions under Section 301
arise,under federal law because the section creates substantive
rights to be declared by the federal courts in evolving a body of
law of collective bargaining agreements ;2 and a few later cases
went on to apply this theory where the only issue was whether
State or federal law should govern substantive rights.2 A few lower
23. Alcoa S. S. Co. v. McMahon, 81 F Supp. 541 (S.D. N.Y. 1948),
aft'd, 173 F 2d 567 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U. S. 821 (1949) ; Inter-
national Longshoreman's Union v. Libby, McNeil & Libby 114 F Supp. 249
(D. Hawaii 1953); Castle & Cooke Terminals v. Local 137, Intl Long-
shoremen's Union, 110 F Supp. 247 (D. Hawaii 1953) (as a reason for
granting motion to remand injunction action to territorial court) ; Associated
Tel. Co. v. Communications Workers, 114 F Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (as
a reason for granting motion to remand injunction action to State courts);
United Pacldng House Workers v. Wilson & Co., 80 F. Supp. 563 (N.D.
Il1. 1948).
24. Declaratory judgment: United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor
Co., 194 F. 2d 997 (7th Cir. 1952) ; AFL v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F. 2d
535 (6th Cir. 1950) ; United Steel Workers v. Shakespeare Co., 84 F. Supp.
267 (W.D. Mich. 1949).
Injunction: Milk & Ice Cream Drivers Local 98 v. Gillespie Milk Prod-
ucts Corp., 203 F. 2d 650 (6th Cir. 1953) (specific enforcement of arbitration
award); United Textile Workers Union v. Goodall-Sanford, 129 F Supp.
859 (D. Me. 1955); Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113
F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953) (enforcing agreement to arbitrate) ; Textile
Workers Union v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 626 (M.D. N.C. 1950) (en-
forcing arbitration award) ;, Mountain States Div., Communications Workers
v. Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co., 81 F Supp. 397 (D. Colo. 1948) (enforc-
ing collective agreement).
25. U. S. Const. Art. III, § 2.
26. United Electrical R. & M. W. of A. v. Oliver Corp., 205 F. 2d
376 (8th Cir. 1953); Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co. v. United Furniture
Workers, 76 F. Supp. 493 (D. Md.), aff'd, 168 F 2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948) ;
Waialua Agricultural Co. v. United Sugar Workers, 114 F. Supp. 243 (D.
Hawaii 1953) ; Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers, 108 F. Supp.
45 (D. Del. 1952); Wilson & Co. v. United Packinghouse Workers, 83 F.
Supp. 162 (S.D. N.Y. 1949).
27. E.g., International Union of Operating Engineers v. Dahlem Constr.
Co., 193 F 2d 470,475 (6th Cir. 1951), Shirley-Herman Co. v. International
1955]
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courts reached the opposite conclusion holding that in suits under
Section 301 State law is controlling on substantive issues just as in
cases where federal jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship.
The Supreme Court justices are also divided. In Westinghmose
Mr. Justice Frankfurter and two colleagues described Section 301
as "a grant of jurisdiction to federal courts over a contract governed
entirely by state substantive law," saying-
"If the section is given the meaning its language spontaneously
yields, it would seem clear that all it does is to give procedural
directions to the federal courts. The aim [disclosed by the
legislative history] was to open the federal courts to stits onl
agreements solely because they were between labor organizations
and employers without providing federal law for such suits.""
Three justices disagreed, arguing that the statute permitted the
federal courts "to fashion federal rules for the construction and
interpretation of those collective bargaining agreements."' -" The
ultimate outcome will turn, therefore, on the votes of the three
uncommitted justices-the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Clark,
who avoided the issue, and Mr. Justice Harlan, who had not taken
his seat when the case was argued.
In my judgment Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view is the more
likely to prevail. LMRA Section 301 is phrased in terms of juris-
diction and standing to sue. It adds a good deal to the words of the
statute to read in an instruction that the district courts shall develop
a body of substantive law It adds immeasurably more to infer that
the federal law should be inclusive, for this conclusion opens the door
to removal of actions commenced in a local forum30 Nor could one
stop there and hope to avoid incongruities. Since Section 301 is prob-
ably inapplicable to suits by individuals,"' the State courts retain
Hod Carriers, 182 F 2d 806 (2d Cir. 1950) , Schatte v. International Alliance,
182 F 2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950), Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, 98 F
Supp. 278 (S.D. N.Y. 1951), Textile Workers Union v. Alco Mfg. Co., 94
F Supp. 626 (M.D. N.C. 1950).
28. Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec-
trical Co., 348 U. S. 437, 443, 447 (1955).
29. Id. at 465.
30. The Judicial Code authorizes removal of "any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction." 28 U. S. C. § 1441 (Supp. 1952). If there is no state cause of
action, every suit for violation of a contract between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce could
be brought in a district court under § 301.
31. Zaleski v. Local 401, U. E. R. & M. W of A., 91 F Supp. 552
(D. N.J. 1950), Schatte v. International Alliance, 84 F Supp. 669 (S.D.
Cal. 1949), aff'd on other grounds, 182 F 2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950). See United
Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 194 F 2d 997, 1000 (7th Cir. 1952).




this jurisdiction. It would create hopeless confusion to have one
rule applicable to suits by a labor organization and another to suits
by individuals. Uniformity could be achieved under a body of
federal substantive law only by holding that the rules of decision
developed by the federal courts were binding in State tribunals.
This would have the rather odd consequence of giving the individual
a cause of action under the laws of the United States on which he
could sue only in a State court. All this may be wise, but is not the
edifice too imposing for the courts to construct on so small a statu-
tory foundation? Since Section 301 is constitutional even though
given only the jurisdictional significance suggested by its words,3-
there is no need to imbue it with far-reaching substantive connota-
tions.
The conclusion that the substantive law to be applied under
Section 301 is State law hardly disposes of the question whether a
union may obtain specific enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate.
An agreement to arbitrate future disputes is valid and binding upon
the parties under the law of nearly every State.3 3 Whether it is
specifically enforceable goes to the remedy; and one might well take
the distinction that although the federal courts are bound to follow
State substantive law, they are not subject to the procedural or
remedial restrictions resting on State tribunals. " In the American
Thread case, Judge W~yzansld held that although specific evidence
was lacking, the Congress which enacted Section 301 "would have
preferred that remedies should be determined 'without reference to
state law and should include specific enforcement of arbitration
clauses in labor contracts."
3 5
There is one serious difficulty with this analysis. The rule which
denied specific enforcement of agreements to arbitrate future dis-
putes is not just a rule o'f procedure. The underlying theory was
that the arbitrator's power like that of an agent is delegated and the
delegation-again as in -the case of an agent-is revocable even
though the revocation is a breach of contract.30 This is substantive
32. See note 21 .ipra.
33. See note 5 supra.
34. See e.g., Guffy v. Smith, 237 U. S. 101 (1915), a case decided prior
to Erie R. R. v. Tompkins which may now be of doubtful validity. Hamilton
Foundries and Machine Co. v. International Molders Union, 193 F. 2d 209
(6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 966 (1952), held that State laws
affecting the remedy must be followed under Section 301.
35. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F Supp. 137,
141 (D. Mass. 1953).
36. -See note 4 supra and text thereto. The point is elaborately discussed
in Justice Peterson's dissenting opinion in Park Constr. Co. v. Independent
School District No. 32, 209 Minn. 182, 296 N. AV. 475, 478 (1941) (dissenting
opinion).
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law Or to put the issue in pragmatic terms, a decision to order
parties to arbitration instead of leaving them to an action of law
(which is really no remedy at all) would be not merely a formal
difference in procedure but a basic departure from the policy applied
in State tribunals. This makes me a little skeptical about my earlier
opinion 3"a that the federal courts may properly grant enforcement ol
arbitration clauses when the State courts would deny the samie
relief.
(5) One question remains even if the plaintiff gets over the
hurdles already noted. Section 1 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
provides that no federal court "shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction i any case
involving or growing out of a labor dispute, except in strict con-
formity with [its] provisions. " It is quite plain that neither of
these requirements can be met in a simple case based upon the
alleged non-performance of an agreement to arbitrate grievances.
Literally, a controversy over the arbitration of a grievance gives
rise to a "labor dispute" because that term includes "any contro-
versy concerning terms or conditions of employment." It cal be
argued, therefore, that a decree ordering a company or union to
proceed to arbitration would be an injunction issued in violation of
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. This was the view taken by Judge
Aldrich in the First Circuit case now pending on appeal.Y7
Since the philosophy of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was that law
served no useful function in the adjustment of labor disputes, it left
management and labor to negotiation backed by self-help and eco-
nomic weapons. Today the law intervenes at numerous points III
industrial relations. Unfortunately, the Norris-LaGuardia Act was
not amended to take account of the conflict between the new rights
and duties and the older policy of legal abstention, but more than
one occasion has seen the courts curtail the scope of the anti-
injunction law in order to reconcile it with later legislation. 8 While
the cases are distinguishable, they strongly support the conclusion
that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not prohibit specific enforce-
ment of an agreement to arbitrate grievances. It was concerned with
strikes and conduct during strikes. Examination of its provisions-
36a. Cox, Grievance Arbitration i the Federal Courts, 67 Harv. L.
Rev. 591 (1954).
37 Local 205, U. E. R. & M. W of A. v. General Electric Co., 129 F
Supp. 665 (D. Mass. 1955)
38. Graham v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 338 U. S. 232, 237
(1949), Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 563
(1937). See also Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Retail Shoe Salesmen's Union.
288 N. Y. 188, 42 N. E. 2d 480 (1942) , Markham & Callow. Inc. v. Inter-
national Woodworkers of America, 170 Ore. 517, 135 P 2d 727 (1943).
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those listing the kinds of conduct which can never be enjoined, those
prescribing the findings which must precede injunctive relief and
also those which regulate judicial procedure-shows that the Act is
not applicable to other kinds of conduct or to the enforcement of
other rights and duties. Consequently, it seems likely that other
courts will accept Judge WVyzanski's statement in the American
Thread case that-
"The general structure, detailed provisions, declaratory pur-
poses, and legislative istory of that statute show it has no ap-
plication to cases where a mandatory injunction is sought to
enforce a contract obligation to submit a controv*ersy to arbitra-
tion under an agreement voluntarily made."30
Arbitration Awards
An arbitration award, once rendered, enjoys a greater degree
of judicial support. The legal situation is much the same as if the
losing party had expressly promised to do the things directed by
the arbitrator. An action for damages will lie for non-performance. 0
Where the award directs the losing party to take steps other than
the payment of money and there is no good way of measuring the
harm done by failure to comply with the award, the successful party
can properly secure a decree for specific performance. In an early
Massachusetts case the court said-
"A submission is virtually a contract to do what shall be award-
ed, and there does not seem to be any reason why it is not as
much a subject of equity as if the contract were complete with-
out the interference of an arbitrator.""'*
These principles provide an adequate remedy for grievance arbi-
tration awards save possibly orders of reinstatenent which equity
might refuse to enforce as personal service contracts. Even here
the old rule may yield to the example of reinstatement orders under
the NLRA.
An arbitrator's decision is final on all questions of fact and law
even though wrong.4- Indeed, an arbitrator has no obligation to
apply the law even as he understands it ;41 however, it should be
39. Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F Supp. 137,
142 (D. Mass. 1953).
40. Williston, Contracts § 1927 (rev. ed. 1938).
41. Jones v. Boston Mill Corp., 4 Pick. 507 (Mass. 1827). See also
Goldstein v. International Ladies Garment Workers, 328 Pa. 385, 196 At.
43 (1938), Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations § 303 (1930).
42. Standard Constr. Co. v. Hoeschler, 245 Wis. 316, 14 N. W 2d 12
(1944) ; Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist. No. 32, 216 Minn.
27, 11 N. W 2d 649 (1943), Larson v. Nygaard, 148 Minn. 104, 180 N. W.
1002 (1921) ; Goddard v. King, 40 Minn. 164, 41 N. V. 659 (1889), Daniels
v. Willis, 7 Minn. 374, 382 (1862) (law).
43. Zelle v. Chicago & N. V Ry., 65 N. W 2d 583, 589 (Minn. 1954).
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understood that if the arbitrator says he is applying the law and
then misconceives it, the award is invalid.4 4 The usual formula is
that an arbitration award will not be set aside except for fraud,
corruption or some mistake so gross that a court treats it as if there
were fraud. There are, however, three other grounds of greater
importance in labor cases.
First, an arbitration award is invalid unless there was a fair
hearing. A fair hearing includes notice of the time and place for
hearing,45 a reasonable time in which to prepare the case and an
opportunity to present evidence and argument. Some care must be
exercised about consulting outsiders, for awards have sometimes
been set aside on the ground that the arbitrators acted on a report
by independent experts without giving the parties an opportunity
to meet it.4 6 On the other hand, it came to be recognized long ago
that an arbitrator may seek advice in reaching his conclusion pro-
vided he makes his own decision.
47
Second, an arbitration award is invalid if it does not make a
complete disposition of the issues submitted. In a Minnesota case,48
for example, the parties submitted the question whether a discharge
was justified either by the employee's petty thievery or by his gen-
erally unsatisfactory record. An award setting aside the discipline
was held invalid because the arbitrators failed to resolve the second
issue.
Third, and most important, an award is invalid at common law
and under most statutes if the arbitrator undertakes to decide an
issue which the parties did not agree to submit to arbitration. Tlis
is the doctrine which gives rise to the vexed problem of "arbitra-
bility," and it brings us to the second part of this discussion.
11. "ARBITRABILITY"
Stated in abstract terms the doctrine of "arbitrability" is as
simple as it is inevitable. Both at common law and also under later
arbitration statutes the courts enforce arbitration awards on the
44. Boston Water Power Co. v. Gray, 6 Metc. 131 (Mass. 1843), see
Goddard v. King, 40 Minn. 164, 41 N. W 659 (1889).
45. Dufresne v. Marine Ins. Co., 157 Minn. 390, 196 N. W 560 (1923).
This includes the right to be present when the other side is presenting its
evidence. Lee v. Tysdal, 163 Minn. 355, 203 N. W 988 (1925)
46. Burns v. Thomas Cook & Sons, 317 Mass. 398, 58 N. E. 2d 150
(1944).
47 See Sturges, Commercial Arbitrations 498-500 (1930), where the
authorities are collected.
48. Mueller v. Chicago & N. W Ry., 194 Minn. 83, 259 N. W 798
(1935). For another illustration of the general principle see Boott Mills v.




theory that they are compelling the losing party to carry out his
promise to comply with the award. The award is final and binding
if made on an'issue which the parties promised to submit to the
arbitrator-for a final and binding decision. Conversely, the award
is not binding if the parties did not agree to submit the issue.
Disputes in the first category came to be called arbitrable. Disputes
in the second category are non-arbitrable. The issue of arbitrability
vel non is simply a question of contract interpretation. It depends
upon (1) a determination as to the exact nature of the controversy
and (2) the meaning of the arbitration agreement.
The principles just stated are simple enough. The difficulty lies
in their application. Suppose that a manufacturer of heavy steam
and water valves is a party to a collective bargaining agreement with
the United Automobile Workers which contains the customary
provisions including a recognition clause, a seniority clause and a
schedule of wage rates. There is also an arbitration clause providing
for the designation of an arbitrator by the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service whenever the parties cannot agree and giving
him power to make a final and binding decision in any dispute con-
cerning "the interpretation or application of this agreement." Six
months after the contract is executed, the employer, instead of fol-
lowing his previously unbroken practice of doing all his own work,
decides to have certain parts machined to specifications by an inde-
pendent contractor. He subcontracts the work and lays off a num-
ber of machinists. The union objects, files a grievance and demands
arbitration. The employer replies that the dispute is not arbitrable
because it does not concern the "interpretation or application of
this agreement," there being no clause in the contract limiting his
freedom to subcontract. The union replies that the obligation is
implied by the recognition clause, seniority provisions and wage
scale, and also by the firm's past practice of doing its own machine
work which is necessarily carried forward by the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
In nine out of ten cases this dispute would be voluntarily sub-
mitted to an arbitrator who would decide both the question of arbi-
trability and also the merits, but the one tough case would raise
difficult questions for the lawyers on both sides, for the arbitrator
and sometimes for a reviewing court.
The union's lawyer, it seems, has the easiest task, for he must
make only a relatively simple decision upon whether his chances of
ultimate victory are worth the time and effort. Unless he is in a
State with an arbitration statute or wishes to seek relief in the
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federal court, his only remedy is to press the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service to appoint an arbitrator despite the employ-
er's objection and then to urge the arbitrator to proceed with the
case regardless of the employer's unwillingness to participate in the
hearing. Apparently the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
will make an appointment under these circumstances. The same
practice is followed by the American Arbitration Association and
other appointing agencies.
If the union chooses to push ahead on this course, the employer's
attorney faces some difficult choices. Should he ignore the whole
proceeding? Since arbitrators dislike proceeding ex parte, this
might end the case, or at worst, snarl it up in endless technicalities
which would discourage future grievances and even discredit the
union and the grievance procedure. Even if the arbitrator heard
the case ex parte and rendered an adverse decision, the company
still might be able to challenge the award in court on the ground
that the issue was not arbitrable. But unless one is willing to dis-
credit grievance arbitration or is seeking to break the union, would
it not be the preferable course from the standpoint of sound labor
relations for the employer to raise the question of arbitrability before
the arbitrator, present the case on the merits reserving the challenge
to the arbitrator's jurisdiction and then, if necessary, attack the
award in the courts ? The legal feasibility of this alternative depends
upon whether presenting the case on the merits waives the challenge
to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator even though the point is prop-
erly raised and overruled. Some lawyers apparently feel doubt on
the point-a doubt justified by an early Pennsylvania case"9 and a
New Hampshire dictumS°--but the modern view is that one who
has raised the question of arbitrability before the arbitrator and lost
may proceed on the merits without losing the right to challenge an
adverse award in any court of competent jurisdiction. This conclu-
sion is supported not only by the analogy to judicial procedure but
also by the invariable practice with respect to administrative hear-
ings. There is also the direct precedent of Kent v. French" and of a
New York case in which Chief Judge Cardozo said-
[T]he rule is well established and of general validity that,
where there is seasonable protest or disclaimer in response to a
claim of jurisdiction, the protest or disclaimer is not nullified by
proceeding thereafter to a hearing on the merits [citations
omitted]. We see no reason to doubt that the rule applies as
49. Christman v. Moran, 9 Pa. 487 (1848).
50. Brampton Woolen Co. v. Local Union 112. 95 N. 1H. 255, 61 A. 2d
796 (1948).
51. 76 Iowa 187 40 N. W 713 (1888)
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fully to a proceeding before an arbitrator. as to one before a
referee or before any board or officer who asserts the right to
judge." -
The adoption of this practice would greatly improve grievance
arbitration by doing away with the ex parte hearings which are
unlikely to do justice and embarrass everyone concerned.
The hypothetical case of subcontracting raises three problems
for the arbitrator: (1) Shall he rule on the issue of arbitrability?
(2) Should he hold one hearing on the issue of arbitrability and,
as employers sometimes insist, make a separate ruling on that ques-
tion before hearing the merits? (3) Is the propriety of subcontract-
ing arbitrable in the hypothetical case?
The first issue is relatively simple. For the arbitrator not to go
ahead would put it into the hands of either party to block arbitra-
tion under existing agreements simply by challenging the arbitrator's
jurisdiction. In a State where there is no arbitration statute en-
forcing future disputes clauses, the moving party is without a remedy
when the arbitrator refuses to proceed.
The other two questions are more difficult. Our hypothetical
arbitration clause was confined to disputes concerning "the inter-
pretation or application of this agreement." Since there was no
express provision dealing with subcontracting, the employer can
argue with a good deal of force that the dispute does not concern
the interpretation of the contract. Nevertheless, two opposing
points must be-considered:
,(1) The employer and umon seldom really expect this form of
arbitration clause to be construed literally. Many contracts con-
taming it limit the employer's right to discharge to discharges for
just cause and say nothing about lesser discipline, yet no one
would seriously challenge an arbitrator's power to rule on the fair-
ness of a six week's disciplinary layoff.
(2) Every contract contains some implied obligations. If A
promises to build B a house and B to pay $20,000, A will be held to
have promised not to interfere with the building of the house even
though the contract contains no explicit mention of this under-
taking. Suppose that a collective bargaining agreement contains no
express limitation on the employer's freedom to discharge and that
the employer fires a man for the sole purpose of circumventing a
seniority clause or preventing the prosecution of a grievance. Surely
we all would agree that under these circumstances there was a
breach of an implied obligation not to deliberately destroy the effect
52. Fimsilver, Still & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 253 N. Y.
382, 171 N. E. 579 (1930).
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of the express promises. In the hypothetical case, if the subcon-
tracting took the form of leasing space and machines in the em-
ployer's plant to a former foreman who hired machinists at $2.00
an hour instead of the $2.50 rate specified in the collective bargain-
ing agreement, would it not be reasonable to say that such an ar-
rangement is nothing more in substance than a scheme for obtain-
ing a supply of labor without observing the wage scale and other
conditions set forth in the contract? Under these circumstances
most arbitrators would rule that the issue was arbitrable and the
subcontracting a violation.r3 On the other hand, if the decision to
subcontract was related to the availability of production facilities,
overhead costs, managerial skill and the like, there would be scant
basis for criticizing the prevailing view that subcontracting is a
management function.
5 4
One conclusion to be drawn from these examples is that the
question of arbitrability is often indistinguishable from the merits.
The real issue is whether the contract fairly sustains the union's
contention. If it does, the dispute is arbitrable. If it does not, it
makes scant difference whether the union's claim is dismissed on
jurisdiction or on the merits. Second, is it not plain in such a case
that nothing can be gained by holding separate hearings on the
issue of arbitrability and on the merits? To merge the two would be
more economical of time and effort and ordinarily would have the
further advantage that the employees, even though they lost, would
not feel that they had been denied a hearing. Of course this is not
always so, but surely it is true in some cases.
From these conclusions several lessons concerning the drafting
of collective bargaining agreements may be derived but before con-
sidering them a word should be said about the other major context
in which arbitration is an important issue-in judicial review
It is settled law that the parties to an arbitration clause may
agree to submit to the arbitrator for final and binding decision all
questions concerning his own jurisdiction. His award on the issue
of arbitrability would then have the same finality as on any other
issue. 5 As an original matter, one might give this effect to the
53. See, e.g., Stockholders Publishing Co., 16 Lab. Arb. Rep. 644
(1951), Park, Davis, and Co., 15 Lab. Arb. Rep. 111 (1950), Celanese Corp.
of America, 14 Lab. Arb. Rep. 31 (1950), Duquesne Light Co., 17 L. R. R. M.
2735 (1945).
54. E.g., Allegheny Ludlam Steel Corp., 23 Lab. Arb. Rep. 171 (1954),
Hercules Powder Co., 21 Lab. Arb. Rep. 330 (1953).
55. Matter of Kelley, 240 N. Y. 74, 147 N. E. 363 (1925) , Frewdberg
Bros. v. Corey, 177 Misc. 560, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1941) Rogers
Diesel & Aircraft Corp. v. Amalgamated Local 259, United Auto Workers,
15 L. R. R. M. 848 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945).
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familiar clause calling for arbitration of "disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of this agreement." The arbitration
clause is a provision of the agreement. Why, therefore, have not the
parties agreed to submit questions concerning its interpretation or
application to the arbitrator? But the course of decision is the other
way and those who dislike the result should not complain too
loudly, for they have only to make their intention more explicit.
Where an arbitrator undertakes to decide a question which
plainly has not been submitted, judicial power to set the award
aside is salutary. No one could quarrel with a court decision in-
validating an a ward which granted a general wage increase or in-
serted a union security clause because the arbitrator thought it was
good industrial relations. The difficulty is that many courts have
used the doctrine in one of two ways to impose their own views
of the merits.
(1) A good many awards have been set aside on the ground
that the arbitrator did not interpret the contract but added a new
obligation. The difficulty is that if you put one meaning on a
contract or statute and I am convinced that it has another, it is
easy for me to say that you have distorted, and therefore altered
or added to, the provision. Suppose the arbitrator ruled in our
hypothetical case that the subcontracting broke an implied promise
not to undercut the wage scale and seniority clause by dealings
with a labor contractor. Even if I thought the decision were wrong,
I would say that the arbitrator had done no more than interpret the
agreement but I suspect that a good many courts which disagreed
would set the award aside on the ground that the arbitration was
not given an interpretation."6
(2) A second parallel doctrine has also developed for enlarging
the judicial function in contract administration. The New York
courts hold-
"[T]he mere insertion by a party of a meaning of a provision
which is clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the words
cannot make an arbitrable issue. If the meaning of the pro-
vision of the contract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute
there cannot be anything to arbitrate and the contract cannot
be said to provide for arbitration."
57
56. Matter of Western Union Tel. Co., 299 N. Y. 177, 86 N. E. 2d 162
(1949) ; Screen Cartoonists Guild v. Disney Productions, 74 Cal. App. 2d
414, 168 P 2d 983 (2d Dist 1946).
57. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler Hammer, Inc., 297
N. Y. 519, 74 N. E. 2d 464 (1947). But see Greyhound Corp. v. Div. 138.
Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 44 Wash. 2d 808, 271 P 2d 689
(1954).
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Under this doctrine the courts decide whether a dispute is too one-
sided. If the judge thinks the grievance is frivolous, he stays the
arbitration, thus making the only effective decision of the dispute.
Perhaps judicial review through the doctrine of arbitrability is
necessary to prevent occasional boners by well-meaning arbitrators.
Unions are sometimes tempted to press frivolous grievances to
harass the employer or serve some internal political objective. 3ut
now that the roll of experienced arbitrators has grown and their
decisions have been canalized by the development of an industrial
jurisprudence, the cause of justice and sound industrial relations
might well be better served by a higher degree of judicial restraint.
While many of the supporters of grievance arbitration believe
there is need for legislation providing effective sanctions for agree-
ments to arbitrate future disputes, they hesitate because the ex-
ample of States like California, Connecticut and New York strong-
ly suggests that the advantages are more than offset by the costs of
a high degree of judicial interference. The proposed Uniform
Arbitration Act prepared under the guidance of Professor Pirsig
makes a step in the right direction by barring application of the
one-sided dispute doctrine, at least until the case has been heard
by the arbitrator on its merits. However, neither this statute nor
any other is likely to be made applicable to grievance arbitration
on a wide scale until some better accommodation is worked out
between judicial interpretation and the views of experienced arbi-
trators.
In conclusion permit me a few diffident observations with re-
spect to the handling of questions of arbitrability at the time a col-
lective bargaining agreement is negotiated. Too little thought is
given to the difficulties we have been discussing before they arise.
Certainly the parties could do much more to specify the way in
which the question of arbitrability is to be handled and some fore-
sighted attorneys take advantage of the opportunity As an outsider,
I would be inclined to favor an express stipulation that the arbitrator
shall have both initial and final authority to determine any question
of arbitrability but it would seem that the least that should be done
would be to provide him with the express power to make a pre-
liminary ruling subject to the condition that participation in arbi-
tration after an adverse ruling should not prejudice a party's right
to raise the question in court.
It is also questionable whether anything is gained by adhering
to the form of arbitration clause which limits the arbitrator to ques-
tions of contract interpretation. Not many years ago the limitation
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was undoubtedly important because there were few experienced
arbitrators and still fewer standards to guide them, but that is
scarcely true today. Regardless of the form of arbitration clause,
arbitrators make their awards on the theory stated by Saul Wallen
in denying a claim for severance pay
"The parties in this case bargained over a contract, reached
an agreement on its salient features, and determined that it
was to govern their relationship for a fixed period. All of the
important elements involved in their relationship were discussed,
considered, and negotiated. On certain ones the parties reached
common understandings and reduced them to writing. With
respect to others, demands were made by one side and rejected
by the other. Provisions covering such subjects were omitted
from the contract. The agreement as finally written was an
embodiment of all of the major elements in the parties' com-
mitinents.".
8
Would it not be better therefore to use the form of arbitration
clause which permits the submission of all disputes that arise dur-
ing the term of the collective agreement, leaving the arbitrator free
and concentrating the attention of the parties on the merits instead
of confusing the proceeding with questions of arbitrability'
58. Inr re Textron, Inc., Esmond Mills, 12 Lab. Arb. Rep. 475, 478
(1949).

